Once Africa’s beacon of freedom, now a region in crisis: What happened to southern Africa?

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By Bongani Matshelela

There was a time when southern Africa carried the moral weight of Africa’s liberation struggle. Its leaders offered sanctuary to freedom movements, defied apartheid and accepted enormous economic and political costs in pursuit of a conviction that freedom could not be secured in one country while its neighbours remained oppressed.

Today, that legacy sits uneasily alongside disputed elections, economic distress, political intolerance and corruption. The contrast is difficult to ignore. What happened to the promise that once made Southern Africa a beacon of hope for the continent?

Describing the region as Africa’s “laughingstock” is deliberately provocative, intended to draw attention to the growing gap between its historic standing and present-day political realities. The criticism is not directed at its people, nor does it diminish the sacrifices made during the liberation struggle.

It is directed at political establishments that continue to invoke that history while falling short of its central obligations: accountable government, constitutional restraint, human dignity and a better life for citizens.

The memory of solidarity

The Frontline States were bound by a conviction that the freedom of one country could not be separated from that of its neighbours. Mozambique’s Samora Machel, Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere and Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda were among the leaders who provided liberation movements with sanctuary, diplomatic support and material assistance, often at considerable cost to their own countries.

Nelson Mandela later came to embody the possibility that liberation could be followed by reconciliation and constitutional democracy.

The creation of the Southern African Development Community in 1992, gave institutional form to the ambition of regional cooperation, economic self-reliance and collective security.

The question today is whether that spirit survives. Too often, solidarity appears to operate between governments rather than between peoples. The Frontline States stood together to help liberate citizens. Their successors must explain why regional diplomacy so frequently appears reluctant to hold incumbent administrations to account.

South Africa’s diminished authority

South Africa’s as the continent’s largest industrial economy, it has long carried political and economic influence beyond its borders. Yet the country that emerged from apartheid with extraordinary international goodwill is wrestling with a shacky unity government, unemployment, crime, corruption, electricity insecurity and deteriorating public services.

The ANC’s loss of its parliamentary majority in the 2024 election was a historic rebuke after three decades of dominance. It reflected public frustration with governance, state capture and the failure to translate the promise of democratic freedom into sufficiently broad-based economic opportunity.

There is also a growing question about the priorities of South African diplomacy. Pretoria has spoken forcefully on the conflict involving Iran, Israel and the wider Middle East, invoking international law and the need for restraint.

Such positions are legitimate matters of foreign policy. But South Africans and neighbouring countries are entitled to ask whether comparable urgency and political energy are being applied to crises closer to home: democratic setbacks in the region, and the insecurity confronting communities across Southern Africa. International moral leadership is more persuasive when it is matched by consistent regional engagement.

Afrophobia further complicates South Africa’s claim to continental leadership. Migrants from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Malawi, Nigeria and elsewhere have faced hostility and violence, often blamed for unemployment, crime and pressure on public services while turning a blind eye on illegal immigrants from China, India and the West.

When liberation becomes entitlement

The ANC, Zimbabwe’s ZANU-PF, Mozambique’s FRELIMO, Angola’s MPLA, Namibia’s SWAPO and Tanzania’s CCM emerged from movements that demanded courage and sacrifice. Their historical contributions deserve recognition. But liberation credentials cannot confer permanent ownership of the state.

The danger arises when governing parties begin to treat political opposition as disloyalty, public institutions as party property and criticism as an act of unpatriotic opposition. In several countries, liberation history has become a powerful political resource, sometimes deployed to defend incumbency rather than to measure performance.

Zimbabwe’s prolonged economic instability, currency crises, corruption allegations and strained public services have widened the distance between the country’s considerable potential and the daily experience of its citizens.

In Mozambique, FRELIMO’s long dominance has collided with demands for credible elections and accountable government. Liberation is not a perpetual mandate. Independence was meant to end arbitrary rule, not merely change the identity of those exercising power.

Elections and the silence after observation

The credibility of elections is under pressure across the region. Zimbabwe’s 2023 elections drew criticism from several observer missions. The central question remains: what meaningful reforms followed the publication of these findings?

An observation mission that documents shortcomings but is followed by diplomatic amnesia risks becoming ceremonial. SADC need not dictate electoral outcomes, but it must take seriously the democratic standards its members have accepted.

Mozambique’s October 2024 elections exposed the same problem in more dramatic fashion. After the electoral commission declared FRELIMO candidate Daniel Chapo the winner, opposition leader Venâncio Mondlane challenged the result and called for nationwide protests.

Demonstrations spread across the country, and the security response attracted international condemnation. The crisis unfolded against the background of an ongoing insurgency in Cabo Delgado, further testing the authority and legitimacy of the state.

Tanzania’s October 2025 elections were followed by widespread protests and a deadly security crackdown. A year later, Human Rights Watch reported that no arrests had been made for human rights violations committed before and during the vote.

It also reported that hundreds of protesters and bystanders had been killed, while the whereabouts of former ambassador and government critic Humphrey Polepole remained unknown. These are grave allegations that demand credible, independent investigation and accountability.

Zambia, once regarded as a relatively stable example of democratic transition, has also faced serious questions following its August 2026 election. Observers cited alleged manipulation of vote tallies, arrests of opposition figures, military deployments at polling and counting sites, and restrictions affecting the courts.

President Hakainde Hichilema was sworn in for a second term while his principal rival, Brian Mundubile, faced treason charges. The allegations and the government’s response deserve transparent scrutiny.

The test of election observation is not how many observers are deployed or how many reports are published. It is whether their findings lead to remedies, institutional reform and greater public confidence.

The temptation of permanent power

The region’s democratic difficulties are compounded by attempts, or proposals, to reshape constitutional arrangements around the ambitions of incumbent leaders.

In Zimbabwe, President Emmerson Mnangagwa signed constitutional amendments into law on 7 July 2026, extending presidential and parliamentary terms from five to seven years and replacing the direct popular election of the president with selection by Parliament.

The changes have been widely criticised because they alter the constitutional framework in ways that could extend his tenure beyond the 2028 departure date envisaged under the previous arrangements.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Senate adopted a constitutional revision bill in June 2026 that could enable a new constitution under which President Félix Tshisekedi’s previous terms would not count, potentially clearing the way for a third term. The proposal has been strongly contested by opposition figures and raises concerns about the constitutional prohibition on revising presidential term limits.

Wealth without prosperity

Economic hardship deepens the region’s disillusionment. Malawi continues to face foreign-exchange and fuel shortages, inflation, debt pressures and food insecurity. Zimbabwe remains burdened by currency instability and weak confidence.

Mozambique’s natural-gas potential has yet to translate into broadly shared prosperity, while insecurity continues to obstruct development. The Democratic Republic of Congo possesses mineral wealth central to the global economy, yet conflict, displacement and poverty remain entrenched.

Even Mauritius, long regarded as a comparatively successful African democracy and economy, has experienced serious tests of public confidence. In October 2026, protests over water shortages and the cost of living escalated after a police officer shot and wounded a woman. The unrest prompted arrests and a temporary nighttime curfew.

Eswatini, Africa’s last absolute monarchy, continues to restrict political participation, with political parties effectively barred from operating as conventional electoral competitors.

Madagascar offers another sobering example. In September 2025, youth-led protests over water and electricity shortages, corruption and poor living conditions escalated into a national crisis. A military-backed takeover in October removed President Andry Rajoelina. The uprising demonstrated the depth of public frustration, but the military’s assumption of power also raised a difficult question: can the removal of an unpopular leader deliver democracy if it is not followed by a credible return to civilian constitutional rule?

The State of the Media in Southern Africa.

The state of the media across Southern Africa offers another troubling measure of the region’s democratic decline. MISA’s Southern Africa Press Freedom Report 2026, covering 11 countries, exposes a widening gap between constitutional guarantees and the realities confronting journalists.

Digital surveillance, restrictive cybersecurity laws, economic pressures and technology-facilitated gender-based violence are increasingly undermining press freedom, the report noted.

Tanzania’s six-day internet shutdown during the 2025 elections demonstrated how readily digital infrastructure can be turned into an instrument of political control.

A region that once fought for freedom of expression must now confront an uncomfortable contradiction: liberation has delivered political independence, but the freedom to question those in power remains increasingly precarious.

SADC’s test

SADC’s credibility will not be measured by the warmth of its summits or the number of communiqués it issues. Respect for sovereignty cannot mean silence when democratic rights are violated. Solidarity cannot mean shielding governments from accountability.

The organisation needs transparent follow-up to election-observation recommendations, a consistent defence of constitutional principles, stronger cooperation against cross-border corruption and drug trafficking, and a firmer commitment to political freedoms. It must move beyond presidential diplomacy and demonstrate that regional integration is ultimately about the welfare and rights of citizens.

Southern Africa once helped teach the continent how to fight for freedom. Its task now is harder: to demonstrate that freedom can be defended through strong institutions, constitutional restraint and accountable leadership.

Until it does, the region will continue to be judged against the promise it once inspired — and found wanting.

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