By Gabriel Manyati
Zimbabweans are rarely asked this question honestly: what if Emmerson Mnangagwa succeeds economically while democracy deteriorates?
Democracy matters. Political competition, free expression and credible elections matter. But history does not establish that liberal democracy is always a prerequisite for prosperity.
Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s founding prime minister, put the argument bluntly in 1992: “A country must first have economic development, then democracy may follow.” That should not be treated as gospel, but neither should it be dismissed because it is politically inconvenient.
Look at Zimbabwe today. The IMF says the economy grew 8.3 percent in 2025 and projects about 5 percent growth in 2026, supported by mining and agriculture. Inflation has also fallen sharply, with official data recording single-digit inflation through July. Yet Zimbabwe remains heavily dollarised, and the ZiG is still slowly gaining acceptance.
A genuinely prosperous Zimbabwe would mean a worker earning enough to buy food without constantly calculating exchange rates. It would mean salaries that retain their value, reliable electricity, functioning hospitals, better roads, affordable housing and businesses able to invest and plan. It would mean young graduates choosing Harare, Bulawayo, Mutare or Gweru over Johannesburg or London because opportunity exists at home.
Now consider the mineral opportunity.
Zimbabwe possesses an extraordinary geological inheritance. Platinum, gold, lithium, diamonds and chrome already generate billions of dollars in exports. Mining contributes about 14.5 percent of GDP and roughly three-quarters of exports. Lithium has become particularly important, although the experience of 2025 demonstrated the danger of confusing rising production with guaranteed wealth.
The real question is therefore not whether Zimbabwe has minerals. It is whether Zimbabwe can build an economy around them.
If lithium is processed locally, platinum supports downstream industries and mining revenue finances infrastructure, the impact could extend far beyond the mine gate. Beneficiation could create chemical processing, engineering, transport, manufacturing and skilled employment. Mining could become the beginning of an industrial chain rather than the end of one.
But transformation requires predictable policy, transparent contracts, credible taxation, reliable electricity, skilled labour, competitive markets and institutions capable of preventing mineral wealth from becoming patronage.
This is where the Mnangagwa question becomes politically difficult.
In July 2026, Mnangagwa signed Constitutional Amendment No. 3 into law, extending presidential terms from five to seven years and replacing the direct popular election of the President with a parliamentary method of selection. Human Rights Watch has documented pressure on opposition parties, activists and civil society during the constitutional reform process.
None of this should be sanitised by pointing to economic statistics.
Yet suppose the economy changes dramatically over the next five years. Suppose electricity becomes dependable. Suppose the ZiG becomes a currency Zimbabweans trust rather than merely tolerate. Suppose inflation remains low, investment accelerates, manufacturing expands, mining revenues become visible public infrastructure, unemployment falls and household incomes rise.
Would Zimbabweans judge Mnangagwa differently?
A parent who can pay school fees without borrowing may make a different calculation from one whose child has emigrated. A manufacturer with access to finance may judge government performance differently from one fighting currency instability. A young person who finds a decent job in Harare may regard political arguments differently from someone preparing to cross the Limpopo.
This is not an argument that prosperity makes repression acceptable. It is an argument about political legitimacy. Governments become harder to dislodge when citizens associate them with rising living standards.
China demonstrates that major economic transformation can occur without liberal democracy. Singapore demonstrates how disciplined institutions, long-term planning and competent administration can generate extraordinary prosperity under a tightly managed political system. Rwanda demonstrates that rapid development can coexist with severe political restrictions. The Gulf states demonstrate that resource wealth can be converted into infrastructure and high living standards without Western-style democratic politics.
But these countries are not identical to Zimbabwe: China has enormous scale, Singapore is a city-state, Rwanda is much smaller, and Gulf economies possess exceptional hydrocarbon revenues.
The lesson is not that authoritarianism produces prosperity. It does not. The lesson is that the relationship between political freedom and development is more complicated. Competent institutions, policy continuity, infrastructure, investment and administrative discipline can sometimes generate growth even where political freedoms are constrained.
Zimbabwe’s danger is that it could capture the political restrictions without capturing the institutional competence.
A mineral boom can produce renewal, but it can also produce politically connected fortunes, opaque contracts and a population watching enormous export figures while remaining poor. Having minerals is not the same as having a mineral economy.
The test for Mnangagwa should therefore be brutally concrete. Can his government turn mineral wealth into broad-based prosperity? Can it create jobs rather than merely announce investment? Can it build power stations rather than issue promises? Can it strengthen the currency without coercion? Can it collect mining taxes transparently? Can it make roads, hospitals and schools work? Can it create conditions in which private businesses prosper without political connections?
Then comes the question Zimbabweans may find hardest to answer.
If Mnangagwa and ZANU PF deliver genuine economic transformation, with stable money, reliable electricity, rising wages, functioning services, jobs and expanding opportunity, while democratic space remains severely restricted, would Zimbabweans still reject them because democracy had been compromised?
Or would prosperity gradually make many citizens willing to forgive, tolerate or reinterpret abuses that today appear unforgivable?
That is the uncomfortable political bargain Zimbabwe may eventually face. Not simply freedom versus dictatorship, but freedom versus prosperity when citizens believe they must choose.
Democracy must remain valuable even when the economy improves. But neither should Zimbabweans pretend that a family whose material life has been transformed will necessarily make the same political judgement as a family trapped in poverty.
The real question is not what you think of Mnangagwa today. It is what you would be willing to forgive him and ZANU PF for if, against the expectations of their critics, Zimbabwe finally became prosperous.
Note*This is an opinion article and the views, opinions, interpretations and conclusions expressed herein are solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect, represent or constitute the views, opinions or official position of National Interest News.
